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Employer and Employee Reasonableness
Regarding Retaliation under the
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense
Ann M. Henryt
Mark, a store manager, allows the store's assistant managers
to assume his supervisory duties when he is not at the store. Ju-
lie, an assistant manager, complains to the district manager that
Mark is creating a sexually hostile work environment. Subse-
quently, Mark continues to allow the other assistant managers to
take over his supervisory role, but in retaliation for her complaint
to the district manager, he no longer allows Julie to do so, de-
priving her of the opportunity to acquire experience valuable for
promotion opportunities. Additionally, although Julie's perform-
ance evaluations have been positive during the four years at her
job, her evaluation after reporting sexual harassment is highly
critical of her performance. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits would hold that such actions are insufficient to constitute
retaliation under Title VII.' This Comment will show why these
circuits are incorrect in their interpretation and application of the
law, and propose an appropriate retaliation standard for sexual
harassment cases under the EllerthiFaragher affirmative de-
fense.
To be liable for retaliation, an employer must take an ad-
verse employment action.2 In the above example, although Mark
t B.A. 1997, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Chicago.
See Page v Bolger, 645 F2d 227, 233 (4th Cir 1981) ("Title VII, most notably
§ 703(aXl), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl), has consistently focused on the question whether
there has been discrimination in what could be characterized as ultimate employment
decisions."); Mattern v Eastman Kodak Co, 104 F3d 702, 707 (5th Cir 1997) (holding that
Title VII addresses only ultimate employment decisions like hiring, firing, granting leave,
promotion, and compensation); Ledergerber v Stangler, 122 F3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir 1997)
(stating that an employment decision that has only a tangential effect on the plaintiff's
employment is not an adverse employment action).
2 To put forth a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that she has
engaged in a protected activity, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that
a causal link exists between the adverse action and the protected activity. Wyatt v City of
Boston, 35 F3d 13, 15 (1st Cir 1994); Quinn v Green Tree Credit Corp, 159 F3d 759, 769
(2d Cir 1998); Robinson v Pittsburgh, 120 F3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir 1997); McNairn v Sulli-
van, 929 F2d 974, 980 (4th Cir 1991); Messer v Meno, 130 F3d 130, 140 (5th Cir 1997);
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had a retaliatory motive, the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
do not classify his conduct as adverse employment actions.' By
the reasoning of these circuits, a change in job duties and nega-
tive evaluations do not constitute adverse employment actions,
even if retaliatory in nature, because they are not ultimate em-
ployment decisions.4
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits' reasoning in support
of the ultimate employment decision test does not conform with
the language or purpose of Title VII's retaliation provision.5 The
retaliation provision contains no language limiting the scope of
the statute to ultimate employment decisions.' Moreover, it runs
counter to the spirit and incentive structures of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth7
and Faragher v City of Boca Raton.! Ellerth and Faragher estab-
lish a two-pronged affirmative defense for employers when an
employee accuses a supervisor of creating a hostile work envi-
ronment9 but has not suffered a tangible employment action as a
result.10 Under Ellerth and Faragher, an employee's claim fails if
she does not make reasonable use of the employer's grievance
Johnson v United States Department of Health & Human Services, 30 F3d 45, 47 (6th Cir
1994); Knox v Indiana, 93 F3d 1327, 1333-34 (7th Cir 1996); Coffman v Tracker Marine,
LP, 141 F3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir 1998); Strother v Southern California Permanente Medi-
cal Group, 79 F3d 859, 868 (9th Cir 1996); Sauers v Salt Lake County, 1 F3d 1122, 1128
(10th Cir 1993); Wideman v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 141 F3d 1453, 1454 (11th Cir 1998);
Passer v American Chemical Society, 935 F2d 322, 331 (DC Cir 1991) (applying Title VII
retaliation standards to an Age Discrimination in Employment Act case).
' Page, 645 F2d at 233; Mattern, 104 F3d at 707; Ledergerber, 122 F3d at 1144.
' The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits require that an adverse employment action
take the form of an ultimate employment decision. Page, 645 F2d at 233; Mattern, 104 F3d
at 709; Ledergerber, 122 F3d at 1144. Ultimate employment decisions include hiring,
firing, promoting, compensating, and permitting leave. See Page, 645 F2d at 233.
See Part II.
' The retaliation provision provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 253, 257 (1964), codified at 42 USC
§ 2000e-3(a) (1994). "No limiting language appears in Title VII's retaliation provision."
McDonnell v Cisneros, 84 F3d 256, 258 (7th Cir 1996).
118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
A prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment is made when the
plaintiff shows (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she suffers unwelcome
sexual conduct that affects a term or condition or her employment, (3) that the conduct
was based on the plaintiffs sex, and (4) that the employer bears responsibility for the
harassment. Henson v City of Dundee, 682 F2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir 1982).
10 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
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procedure. Yet actions short of ultimate employment decisions
will likely be sufficient to chill employees from filing complaints
because such actions interfere with the employee's employment
opportunities. Instead of using the ultimate employment decision
standard, when deciding whether an employment decision rises
to the level of actionable retaliation, courts should consider
whether the actions affect the employee's current ability to per-
form her job or whether the employee's future employment oppor-
tunities are affected.
Claims of employer retaliation are relevant to the El-
lerth/Faragher affirmative defense for two reasons. First, courts
will have to decide whether an employer who takes a retaliatory
action has behaved unreasonably under the first prong of the af-
firmative defense. Second, courts will have to consider whether
an employee behaves unreasonably when she fails to complain of
harassment for fear of retaliation, given a broader definition of
adverse employment actions than the ultimate employment deci-
sion test.
Part I of this Comment explains the Ellerth and Faragher
decisions and outlines the current state of Title VII retaliation
law. Part II critiques the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits' rea-
soning underlying the ultimate employment decision standard
and argues that courts should protect employees from a wide
range of retaliatory action. Part III examines employer and em-
ployee reasonableness with respect to retaliation under the El-
lerth/Faragher affirmative defense assuming a broad definition of
adverse employment action. Part III concludes that an employer
who retaliates should fail the first prong of the affirmative de-
fense. An employee who can prove specific threats of retaliation
should have the opportunity to prove that she acted reasonably in
accord with the second prong of the defense.
I. THE ELLERTH/FARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Before Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth" and Faragher v
City of Boca Raton,12 lower courts divided over when to hold an
employer liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment of employ-
ees." In Ellerth and Faragher, the Supreme Court established a
" 118 S Ct 2257 (1998).
12 118 S Ct 2275 (1998).
Compare Harrison v Eddy Potash, Inc, 112 F3d 1437, 1444 (10th Cir 1997) (hold-
ing employer not liable for sexual harassment of supervisor because the behavior was
outside the scope of the employment), with Kauffman v Allied Signal, Inc, 970 F2d 178,
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standard of employer liability for sexual harassment perpetrated
by supervisors.'
A. The Ellerth and Faragher Opinions
The Supreme Court held in Ellerth and Faragher that when
a supervisor creates a sexually hostile work environment result-
ing in a tangible employment action taken against the employee,
such as firing or failure to promote, the employer is vicariously
liable for the supervisor's behavior. 5 The Court reasoned that
when a supervisor uses authority to take an action against the
employee, the supervisor acts as the employer's agent."
When an employee suffers no tangible employment action,
the Court constructed a different standard of liability. In this
situation, the employer can avoid vicarious liability if it prevails
on the Court's newly-created affirmative defense. 7 The affirma-
tive defense has two prongs. First, the employer must show that
it took reasonable steps to prevent harassment." The Court
stated that a sexual harassment policy and complaint procedure
would typically satisfy the first requirement. 9 When a complaint
arises, the employer must follow its complaint procedure and act
quickly to investigate and terminate sexual harassment commit-
ted by its supervisors. 0
184-85 (6th Cir 1992) (holding that supervisor who sexually harasses acts within the
scope of employment).
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
, Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2269 ("When a supervisor makes a tangible employment deci-
sion, there is assurance the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency rela-
tion.").
" Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2292-93 ("An employer is subject
to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment cre-
ated by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an af-
firmative defense to liability or damages.").
" Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293 ("The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasona-
bly failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.").
, Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270 ("While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-
harassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter
of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appro-
priately be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense."); see
also Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
"The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercise
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior." Ellerth,
118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293 (emphasis added).
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The second prong of the defense requires the employer to
prove "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."21 This prong of the
affirmative defense also focuses on the employer's harassment
policy. The Court stated that the employee's failure to use the
employer's complaint procedure generally is sufficient to show the
employee's unreasonable behavior.22 Additionally, the Court
stated that the employer could offer other evidence of the em-
ployee's unreasonableness, but did not describe what such evi-
dence might entail.'
In Faragher, the Court had its first opportunity to apply the
affirmative defense and held the employer liable for
harassment.' The plaintiff, Beth Ann Faragher, a lifeguard, al-
leged that two supervising lifeguards harassed her through un-
welcome touching and offensive remarks.25 Although the City of
Boca Raton, her employer, had a sexual harassment policy, it
failed to distribute this policy to any employees in Faragher's de-
partment." The Court also found the policy ineffective because it
provided no means through which an employee could bypass the
harassing supervisor in making complaints. Therefore, the
Court held that the employer failed to meet its burden of proving
either prong of the affirmative defense.'
In summary, Ellerth and Faragher established a two-pronged
affirmative defense for employers when a supervisor creates a
hostile working environment.' The defense requires the employer
to prove that it promulgated a sexual harassment policy and
complaint procedure and that the employee unreasonably failed
to avail herself of the procedure.0
2 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270:
And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obli-
gation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any un-
reasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the em-
ployer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
See also Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Id at 2280.
Id.
Id.
Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
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B. Employer Retaliation
The first prong of the affirmative defense enunciated in El-
lerth and Faragher raises the following question: should an em-
ployer retain the affirmative defense when it retaliates against
an employee who utilizes the employer's complaint procedure?
Deciding whether an employer has taken a retaliatory action re-
quires examining Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions to deter-
mine what kind of employee action the retaliation provision pro-
tects, as well as what employer actions it forbids.
1. Protected Activity under Title VII's Retaliation Provision.
Section 704 of Title VIIPM states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to discriminate against any of his employees or ap-
plicants for employment ... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this ti-
tle, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceed-
ing, or hearing under this title.32
An employee can establish a prima facie case of retaliation if she
has engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employ-
ment action, and established a causal link between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.3 If the plaintiff puts
forward a prima facie case, the employer must provide a legiti-
mate, non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse action in or-
der to avoid liability. 4 Once the employer meets its burden of
production by articulating a legitimate reason for its decision, the
42 USC § 200Oe-3(a).
Id.
Wyatt v City of Boston, 35 F3d 13, 15 (1st Cir 1994); Quinn v Green Tree Credit
Corp, 159 F3d 759, 760 (2d Cir 1998); Robinson v Pittsburgh, 120 F3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir
1997); McNairn v Sullivan, 929 F2d 974, 980 (4th Cir 1991); Messer v Meno, 130 F3d 130,
140 (5th Cir 1997); Johnson v United States Department of Health & Human Services, 30
F3d 45, 47 (6th Cir 1994); Knox v Indiana, 93 F3d 1327, 1333 (7th Cir 1996); Coffman v
Tracker Marine, LP, 141 F3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir 1998); Strother v Southern California
Permanente Medical Group, 79 F3d 859, 868 (9th Cir 1996); Sauers v Salt Lake County, 1
F3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir 1993); Wideman v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 141 F3d 1453, 1454
(11th Cir 1998); Passer v American Chemical Society, 935 F2d 322, 331 (DC Cir 1991)
(applying Title VII retaliation standards to an Age Discrimination in Employment Act
case).
See, for example, Fennell v First Step Designs, Ltd, 83 F3d 526, 535 (lst Cir 1996).
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plaintiff must prove that the employer's reasons are pretext for
retaliation to prevail on her claim.35
The retaliation provision contains a participation clause and
an opposition clause. 6 Under the participation clause, an em-
ployee is protected when she participates in an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") investigation.37 The
clause covers activity such as filing an EEOC charge or serving as
a witness in an EEOC investigation.38
The opposition clause proscribes a broader ranger of em-
ployer conduct than the participation clause. The opposition
clause protects plaintiffs who file informal or formal discrimina-
tion and harassment complaints with their employers,39 an im-
portant factor for the plaintiff who follows the Supreme Court's
admonition in Ellerth and Faragher to comply with her em-
ployer's sexual harassment grievance procedure. In addition to
protecting a plaintiff who follows formal internal grievance pro-
cedures, the opposition clause also protects "informal protests of
discriminatory employment practices, including making com-
plaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, pro-
testing against discrimination by industry or by society in gen-
eral, and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal
charges."40 For example, the plaintiff in Pharr v Rockford Hous-
ing Authority,41 sent a letter to her supervisor stating that she
believed a reprimand she received was "the result of the racist
and sexist climate that has developed within Rockford Housing
Authority and which you foster. I am a black female and my
rights have been violated."42 The district court concluded that this
letter was protected activity.43
Id.
42 USC § 2000e-3(a) (making it unlawful to discriminate against an employee
either "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
this subchapter or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing
under this subchapter").
37 Clover v Total System Services, Inc, 157 F3d 824, 829 (11th Cir 1998)
("[I]nvestigation... under this subchapter means an unlawful employment practice inves-
tigation conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or its
designated representative. It does not mean an employer's in-house investigation."). See
also Kaible v US Computer Group, Inc, 27 F Supp 2d 373, 378 (E D NY 1998) (holding that
statements made to company's attorney in connection with an EEOC charge fell within
the participation clause).
Morris v Boston Edison Co, 942 F Supp 65, 70-71 (D Mass 1996).
Barber v CSX Distribution Services, 68 F3d 694, 702 (3d Cir 1995); Sumner v
United States Postal Service, 899 F2d 203, 209 (2d Cir 1990).
o Sumner, 899 F2d at 209.
" 1998 US Dist LEXIS 16836 (N D ill).
42 Id at *5.
, Id at "13-14.
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2. Adverse Employment Action.
While courts generally agree about the standards for evalu-
ating whether a plaintiff engages in protected activity, the cir-
cuits have split over what constitutes an adverse employment
action necessary to satisfy the plaintiff's prima facie case of re-
taliation. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits define adverse
employment actions as "ultimate employment decisions," includ-
ing hiring, firing, demotion, promotion, granting leave, and de-
termining compensation."
The Fourth Circuit, although not in the context of a retalia-
tion case, originated the ultimate employment decision standard
that other circuits have adopted. In Page v Bolger,5 the plaintiff
sued the Postmaster General for violating § 717 of Title VII. The
plaintiff, who was black, argued that an all-white review commis-
sion discriminated against him when they denied him a promo-
tion, even though policies provided that one of the commission
members should be black or female.47 He contended that the
Postmaster General's decision to depart from the affirmative ac-
tion program for appointing members to the commission consti-
tuted a discriminatory personnel action. 8
To define "personnel action," as used in § 717, the Fourth
Circuit looked at the types of actions § 703(a)(1) of Title VII for-
bids. Section 703(a)(1) makes it an unlawful employment practice
to discriminate in hiring, firing, compensation or other terms,
condition, and privileges of employment.49 The court noted that
§ 703 "has consistently focused on the question of whether there
has been discrimination in what could be characterized as ulti-
mate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, dis-
charging, promoting, and compensating."" Additionally, the
" Page v Bolger, 645 F2d 227, 233 (4th Cir 1981); Mattern v Eastman Kodak Co, 104
F3d 702, 707 (5th Cir 1997); Ledergerber v Stangler, 122 F3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir 1997) ("A
transfer involving only minor changes in working conditions and not reduction in pay or
benefits will not constitute an adverse employment action.").
645 F2d 227 (4th Cir 1981).
,6 Id at 228. Section 717 provides that "[aill personnel actions affecting employees...
in the United States Postal Service ... shall be made free from any discrimination based
on race." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 717, Pub L No 88-352, as added, Pub L No 92-261, 86
Stat 111, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-16(a) (1994).
'" Page, 645 F2d at 228.
4' Id at 232.
" Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 78 Stat 253, 255, codified at 42 USC § 2000e-2(aX1)
(1994). The full text states that "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
Page, 645 F2d at 233.
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Fourth Circuit stated that there are some interlocutory employ-
ment decisions that neither § 717 nor any of Title VII's provisions
are designed to reach.5'
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit in Mattern v East-
man Kodak Co,52 looked to § 703 for aid in interpreting another
provision of Title VII, in this case, § 704, the retaliation
provision.53 Both § 704 and § 703(a)(1) use the term "discrimi-
nate.' 4 Therefore, in interpreting § 704, the Fifth Circuit looked
for guidance in § 703."5 Because § 703 uses the term "discrimi-
nate" in connection with hiring, refusal to hire, discharge, and
compensation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the term "dis-
criminate" in § 704 should be interpreted to prohibit only these
same actions when taken in retaliation.6 However, the Fifth Cir-
cuit overlooked the fact that § 703(a)(1) also forbids discrimina-
tion in the terms and conditions of employment,57 which supports
the view that Title VII should reach more than ultimate employ-
ment decisions.5" In Mattern, the Fifth Circuit held that hostility
from other employees was not an ultimate employment decision
sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action.59
5 Id.
104 F3d 702 (5th Cir 1997).
Id at 708-09.
Compare 42 USC § 2000e-3(a), making it
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment . . because he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this [title],
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [title],
with 42 USC § 2000e-2(aX1), making it an unlawful employment practice
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individuals' race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Mattern, 104 F3d at 709.
Id.
See note 54 and accompanying text.
See Melissa A. Essary and Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA- Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved
Courts, 63 Mo L Rev 115, 141 ("However, the Fifth Circuit's ultimate employment decision
standard appears to contradict even the plain language of the substantive anti-
discrimination clause. Under the statute, discrimination in the 'terms and conditions' of
employment is as actionable as the easily identifiable actions of hiring and firing."). For
further discussion of Title VII's language, see Part II A.
' Contrast id at 707 with Gunnell v Utah Valley State College, 152 F3d 1253, 1264-
65 (10th Cir 1998) (holding that co-worker hostility and harassment could constitute ad-
verse employment actions if the harassment were severe and the employer organized or
acquiesced in the harassment).
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The Eighth Circuit applied the ultimate employment decision
test in Ledergerber v Stangler.e The Eighth Circuit stated that in
order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff
has to show that she suffered an adverse employment action that
"effectuated a material change in the terms or conditions of her
employment." 1 The plaintiff in this case could not demonstrate a
materially adverse action when her employer reassigned her staff
after she filed a complaint of racial discrimination. 2 In the
Eighth Circuit's view, although replacing the plaintiffs staff
"may have had a tangential effect on her employment, it did not
rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision intended to
be actionable under Title VII."
In contrast to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, the
Eleventh Circuit recently defined adverse employment action
more broadly.' In Wideman v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc,65 the court
concluded that the plaintiff's employer retaliated against her
when her manager reprimanded her, delayed authorizing medical
treatment, and asked co-workers to give negative statements
about the plaintiff." The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the lan-
guage of § 704 does not limit retaliatory discrimination to ulti-
mate employment actions. 7 Additionally, the court viewed its
interpretation as more consistent with Title VII's purposes than
the ultimate employment decision approach. If employers can
retaliate so long as they do not discharge or demote an employee,
122 F3d 1142 (8th Cir 1997).
" Id at 1144.
Id.
Id.
, Other circuits also define adverse employment actions broadly. See Wyatt v City of
Boston, 35 F3d 13, 15-16 (lst Cir 1994) (recognizing that adverse actions include dis-
charges, demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, denials of promotions,
undeserved negative evaluations, and toleration of harassment by co-workers); Hampton v
Borough of Tinton Falls Police Dept, 98 F3d 107, 116 (3d Cir 1996) (holding that a transfer
or assignment that does not result in a tangible loss constitutes an adverse action); Smart
v Ball State University, 89 F3d 437, 441 (7th Cir 1996) ("Adverse employment action has
been defined quite broadly in this circuit."); Strother v Southern California Permanente
Medical Group, 79 F3d 859, 869 (9th Cir 1996) (finding adverse employment actions when
employer denied plaintiff the opportunity to attend educational seminars, excluded her
from meetings, subjected her to harassment from co-workers, and gave her a more de-
manding work schedule).
141 F3d 1453 (lth Cir 1998).
6, Id at 1455-56.
Id at 1456 ("Read in the light of ordinary understanding, the term 'discriminate' is
not limited to 'ultimate employment decisions.'). See also Passer v American Chemical
Society, 935 F2d 322, 331 (DC Cir 1991) (noting that a parallel anti-retaliation provision
in the ADEA "does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of cog-
nizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion").
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employees may still be unwilling to complain of harassment for
fear of other forms of retaliation, the court reasoned.'
C. Plaintiffs Failure to Follow Grievance Procedures Because of
Fear of Retaliation.
The second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense
raises the question of whether an employee's fear of retaliation is
a reasonable justification for failing to avail herself of an em-
ployer's sexual harassment complaint procedure. Several courts
applying the new affirmative defense have concluded that the
employee acted unreasonably when failing to complain of har-
assing behavior out of fear of retaliation. For example, this fact
pattern emerged in Sconce v Tandy Corp,9 and the court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment.7" The employee,
Nicole Sconce, and the employer conceded that Sconce's supervi-
sor subjected her to a hostile working environment by touching
her and making offensive comments.71 Even though Sconce knew
Tandy had a sexual harassment policy, she never reported this
conduct, claiming that her supervisor threatened to terminate
her if she filed a complaint.72 After Tandy granted her request for
a transfer to another store, Sconce filed a complaint with the
EEOC, which led Tandy to initiate its own investigation.7" As a
result of the investigation, Tandy reprimanded the supervisor
and ordered him not to have any contact with Sconce.74
On these facts, the district court in Sconce concluded that the
plaintiffs failure to report the harassment was unreasonable.75
Sconce feared retaliation if she complained to her employer, but
the court pointed out that Tandy's policy allowed her to bypass
filing a complaint with her immediate supervisor, who was also
the harasser.7" The district court worried that allowing an em-
ployee to avoid reporting harassment any time the employee
feared retaliation would undermine the affirmative defense.77 In
this case, the court required additional evidence to justify
Sconce's fears, such as evidence that Tandy's procedures were
141 F3d at 1456.
9 F Supp 2d 773 (W D Ky 1998).
" Id at 778.
Id at 775.
Id at 778.
9 F Supp 2d at 775.
', Id.
" Id at 778.
' Id.
" 9 F Supp 2d at 778.
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ineffective or unfairly administered.78 Because Sconce could offer
no such evidence, the district court concluded that she acted un-
reasonably in failing to report harassing conduct and granted
sxnmary judgment in favor of Tandy.79
In a factually similar case, the district court in Fierro v Saks
Fifth Avenues' held that the plaintiff acted unreasonably when he
failed to report racial harassment." It applied the El-
lerthIFaragher affirmative defense to a racially hostile work envi-
ronment claim. 2 As in Sconce, the plaintiff in Fierro was aware of
the employer's harassment policy yet failed to file a complaint
because he "was afraid of repercussions. If you start to conflict
with you [sic] manager, before you know it its [sic] not a very
pleasant outcome."' Fierro did not produce evidence that other
employees suffered retaliation when they used the defendant's
complaint procedure."4 He also could not explain what repercus-
sions he feared. 8 The district court determined that Fierro's un-
supported assertions of fear of retaliation did not create a genu-
ine issue of material fact.88 Thus, the defendant prevailed on the
affirmative defense and won summary judgment.87
Johnson v Brown"' serves as an example of the facts neces-
sary to establish a reasonable fear of retaliation. In Johnson, the
plaintiff, Michelle Johnson, accused her supervisor of sexual har-
assment. 9 Johnson did not complain of harassment that began in
September 1990 until January 1992.0 In addition to repeated
offensive remarks, harassing incidents included Johnson's super-
visor locking her in a room and exposing himself to her, trying to
separate her legs as she moved from her desk to a typewriter, and
rubbing his body up against her.1 The district court found it rea-
sonable that her failure to report resulted from her supervisor's
threats of termination. 2 Although the court did not explicitly
Id.
Id.
13 F Supp 2d 481 (S D NY 1998).
SI Id at 493.
Id at 492.
Id.
513 F Supp 2d at 492.
Id.
Id at 493.
Id.
1998 US Dist LEXIS 12689 (N D Ill).
Id at *1.
Id at *2, "6.
'5 Id at *3-4.
1998 US Dist LEXIS 12689 at *12-13. Although the district court found Johnson's
delay in reporting harassment reasonable, the court nevertheless failed to find the em-
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state what the supervisor said to Johnson, the court's finding of
credibility of Johnson's fear of termination suggests that Wil-
liams made specific threats to terminate Johnson.
Most courts have ruled against plaintiffs claiming that they
failed to report sexual harassment out of a fear of retaliation be-
cause the plaintiffs have offered no evidence to support their
fears." Before a court will find a plaintiffs fear of retaliation rea-
sonable, courts have required some evidence supporting the
plaintiff's belief that her employer would retaliate, such as actual
threats to retaliate,94 past evidence of retaliation, or unfair ad-
ministration of complaint procedures. 5 Speculation of retaliation
fails to excuse an employee who decides not to complain to her
employer."
II. DEFINING ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION BROADLY
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions heighten the importance
of employers adopting and employees utilizing internal grievance
procedures. 7 To encourage employees to use grievance proce-
dures, employers must protect them from retaliation. A liberal
definition of adverse employment action best suits the goal of en-
couraging employees to bring sexual harassment complaints to
the attention of their employers. Courts should define adverse
employment actions broadly in order to fit with Title VII's prohi-
bition of employment discrimination generally, not merely em-
ployer liable because it incorrectly applied the affirmative defense. Under Ellerth and
Faragher, the employer must prove both that it reasonably responded to complaints and
that the employee behaved unreasonably in failing to use the employer's complaint proce-
dure. Here, since the court found that Johnson's delay was not unreasonable, the employer
should have been held liable.
See, for example, Jones v USA Petroleum Corp, 20 F Supp 2d 1379 (S D Ga 1998):
Plaintiffs seek to justify this failure by claiming a fear or repercussion
from Brown if they reported his behavior. This allegation is based merely
on conclusory assertions that Wilson and Jones felt they would get into
trouble if they reported Brown's behavior. As such, it is insufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Id at 1386 (citations omitted); Montero v AGCO Corp, 19 F Supp 2d 1143, 1146 (E D Cal
1998) (holding plaintiff's fear of retaliation an insufficient reason to wait two years before
complaining of harassment).
Johnson, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 12689 at *12-13.
Sconce, 9 F Supp 2d at 778.
Id. See also Fierro, 13 F Supp 2d at 492.
See Beverly W. Garafalo, Practical Guidelines for Employers, 13 No 2 Corp Coun-
sellor 3 (July 1998) ("Thus, while employers in recent years have been diligent in adopting
sexual harassment policies, preventative measures, adequate complaint procedures and
an effective response are now more important than ever.").
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ployment discrimination which results in ultimate employment
decisions. Finally, a broad interpretation of adverse employment
action also accords with the liberal reading courts have given to
other aspects of the retaliation provision. 8
A. Title VII's Language
A broader definition of adverse employment action better ac-
cords with Title VII's language. Unlike Title VII's substantive
discrimination provisions, no limiting language appears in the
retaliation provision.9 For instance, § 703 of Title VII makes it an
unlawful employment practice
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."'
In contrast, the retaliation provision makes it an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to discriminate against some-
one who has participated in a Title VII enforcement proceeding or
opposed conduct made unlawful under Title VI. 1 As the Sev-
enth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have demonstrated, the retalia-
tion provision contains no language restricting adverse actions to
those enumerated in § 703."2 The absence of limiting language
suggests that Congress intended the retaliation provision to pro-
hibit a broader range of conduct than the substantive discrimina-
tion provisions.0 8 Consequently, the language of the statute sup-
ports the view that adverse employment actions include a broad
range of conduct beyond ultimate employment decisions.
Although the language of the statute as a whole supports a
broad definition of adverse employment action, the Fifth Circuit
nonetheless used the language of the statute to reach its holding
that § 704 prohibits retaliation only when it rises to the level of
an ultimate employment decision.10 4 To interpret the term "dis-
criminate" in § 704, the Fifth Circuit looked to § 703(a), Title
See Part 1ID.
See McDonnell v Cisneros, S4 F3d 256, 258 (7th Cir 1996).
42 USC § 2000e-2(aXl) (1994).
'0' 42 USC § 2000e-3(a).
" Wideman v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, 141 F3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir 1998); McDonnell,
84 F3d at 258; Passer v American Chemical Society, 935 F2d 322, 331 (DC Cir 1991).
McDonnell, 84 F3d at 259.
104 Mattern v Eastman Kodak Co, 104 F3d 702, 708-09 (5th Cir 1997).
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VII's main provision prohibiting employment discrimination."5
Section 703(a)(1) makes it an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate in hiring, firing, compensation, or
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."6 Addi-
tionally, § 703(a)(2) makes it an unlawful employment practice
for an employer
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.' 7
The Fifth Circuit noted that while § 703(a)(1) uses the term
"discriminate" in connection with actions such as firing and com-
pensating, § 703(a)(2) forbids practices that merely tend to affect
employment opportunities.' ° Because § 703(a)(1), like § 704, uses
the term discriminate while § 703(a)(2) does not, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that § 703(a)(1) should control its interpretation of
§ 704, the retaliation provision.0 9 According to this reasoning,
because § 703(a)(1) limits discrimination to ultimate employment
decisions like hiring, firing, and compensation, it should also
limit the retaliation provision to prohibit employer conduct only
when it takes the form of an ultimate employment action."0
The Fifth Circuit's statutory reading is unpersuasive. The
court distinguishes between acts that discriminate and acts that
limit, segregate, or classify employees based on race, sex, religion,
or national origin. The Fifth Circuit calls the harm resulting from
§ 703(a)(2) violation "vague harms" because a violation can arise
from action that only "tend[s] to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
employee.""' However, the distinction between acts that dis-
criminate and acts that limit, segregate, or classify is misplaced.
The Fifth Circuit's reading implies that acts that limit, segregate,
106 Id.
10 42 USC § 2000e-2(aX1).
42 USC § 2000e-2(aX2).
Mattern, 104 F3d at 709 ("The anti-retaliation provision speaks only of 'discrimina-
tion'; there is no mention of the vague harms contemplated in § 2000e-2(a)(2)
[§ 703(aX2)].V).
"I Id at 708-09.
110 Id at 709.
1 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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or classify result from something other than discrimination,
rather than what they really are, a specific form of discrimina-
tion. The proper question before the Fifth Circuit was not what it
means to discriminate, but whether the statute prohibits a par-
ticular form of discrimination or adverse employment action,
however slight that adverse action may be.
B. Ellerth and Faragher's Incentive to Resolve Sexual Harass-
ment Complaints Internally
Broadening the definition of adverse employment action not
only better reflects the language of Title VII, it also effectuates
the purposes of Title VII that the Supreme Court emphasized in
Ellerth and Faragher. In these decisions, the Supreme Court
stated that preventing employment discrimination is one of the
main purposes of Title VII." 2 While providing remedies to dis-
crimination victims represents an important goal of Title VII, the
statute best serves its function when it prevents discrimination
from occurring in the first place." 3 Thus, the Ellerth/Faragher
affirmative defense focuses on preventing and remedying sexual
harassment through an employer's internal sexual harassment
policy and complaint procedure."'
Courts have emphasized that Congress intended to encourage
employers and employees to conciliate rather than litigate their
grievances involving discrimination within the workplace." 5 An
informal resolution in the workplace will often be more produc-
tive in resolving a complaint than going directly to the EEOC and
initiating a costly and adversarial proceeding against the em-
ployer.""
112 Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v City of
Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2292 (1998) (Title VII's "primary objective,' like that of any
statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.").
' Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270 ("To the extent limiting employer liability could encour-
age employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would
also serve Title VII's deterrent purpose."); Faragher v City of Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275,
2292 (1998) (same).
"' See Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270.
115 Id ("Were employer liability to depend in part on an employer's effort to create
such [sexual harassment complaint] procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to
promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context."); Faragher, 118 S Ct
at 2292 ("It would therefore implement clear statutory policy and complement the Gov-
ernment's Title VII enforcement efforts to recognize the employer's affirmative obligation
to prevent violations and give credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to
discharge their duty.").
"' Hearn v R R Donnelley & Sons Co, 460 F Supp 546, 548 (N D Ill 1978) ("To require
the initiation of an adversarial or formal investigative proceeding as a condition precedent
to the applicability of § 704(a) would frequently be so disruptive as to be counterproduc-
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Each prong of the EllerthiFaragher affirmative defense en-
courages internal resolution of sexual harassment complaints.
The first prong of the affirmative defense encourages and in some
cases requires an employer to adopt a sexual harassment policy
and grievance mechanism.117 When asserting the affirmative de-
fense, an employer must prove that:
it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior .... While
proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-
harassment policy with complaint procedure is not neces-
sary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances
may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigat-
ing the first element of the defense. " '
A sexual harassment policy serves two purposes. First, the
policy defines for employees the term sexual harassment and
thus sets boundaries on their behavior."' Second, an effective
grievance procedure gives the employee a means to report har-
assing behavior as it occurs. 2 ° If an employee comes forward, she
gives the employer the opportunity to stop harassment, discipline
the harasser, and prevent further harm. An employer who does
not enact an internal complaint procedure increases the chance
that it will be unable to prove that it behaved reasonably and
thus increases its risk of liability.121 Thus, the affirmative defense
gives the employer a financial incentive to enact an effective
complaint procedure.122
tive. Internal processes, whenever available, are surely the preferable vehicle by which to
bring an employer into compliance with the statute.").
117 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
.. Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
11. See Michael F. Kleine, Practical Advice for Employers in Anticipation of Faragher's
Outcome, 6 No 2 Empl L Strategist 1, 6 (1998) ("Sexual harassment means different
things to different people. An employer should not leave to supervisors and other employ-
ees the determination of what behavior will be considered harassment. Accordingly, the
policy should define harassment and provide examples of sexually harassing conduct.").
" Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2292 ("An employer may, for example, have provided a
proven, effective mechanism for reporting and resolving complaints of sexual harassment,
available to the employee without undue risk or expense.").
121 See, for example, id at 2293 (employer liable for sexual harassment when it did not
distribute its sexual harassment policy to all employees). Faragher does not explicitly
require that an employer create a sexual harassment policy to avoid liability, explaining
that a formal harassment policy may not be necessary for a small employer. Id.
1" Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270 ("Were employer liability to depend in part on an em-
ployer's effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress' intention to promote
conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context."); Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2292
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However, even the most well-written sexual harassment pol-
icy will prove ineffective unless employees take advantage of it.
The second prong of the affirmative defense promotes internal
resolution of complaints by giving the employee an incentive to
report harassment, encouraging her to try to resolve her griev-
ance before resorting to Title VII's remedies.123 As demonstrated
by Sconce v Tandy,24 if an employee files a complaint with the
EEOC before notifying the employer of harassing behavior, the
employee decreases the likelihood that she will recover under Ti-
tle VII.L " Thus, Ellerth and Faragher give the employee a finan-
cial incentive to use her employer's grievance procedures. If the
employee delays in using or fails to use the policy, she risks los-
ing part or all of her opportunity to recover damages.12
Although the affirmative defense gives employees a financial
incentive to utilize their employers' complaint procedures, that
incentive may not be enough if employers can retaliate through
harassment or reprimands. A more liberal definition of adverse
employment action is necessary because, in many occupations, an
employee's duties depend on the work assignments she receives
from her supervisor. However, the ultimate employment decision
standard does not reach an employer's work assignment deci-
sions. '2 For example, an advertising executive relies on her boss
to let her work on a big account. A partner in a law firm asks an
associate to work on a complex transaction. In these examples,
the supervisor determines the quality of work experiences and
skills that the employee acquires. If the employee alleges to her
employer that her supervisor subjected her to a hostile work en-
vironment, the supervisor could be subject to disciplinary action,
which would give the supervisor a motive to retaliate against the
complainant." The supervisor could retaliate by altering the
(affirmative defense "give[s] credit [ ] to employers who make reasonable efforts to dis-
charge their duty.").
1" Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270 ("[L]imiting employer liability could encourage employees
to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe and pervasive."); Faragher, 118 S Ct
at 2292.
9 F Supp 2d 773 (W D Ky 1998).
12 Id at 778.
' Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2292 ("If the plaintiff unreasonably failed to avail herself of
the employer's preventive or remedial apparatus, she should not recover damages that
could have been avoided if she had done so."). See also Dull v Saint Luke's Hospital of
Duluth, 21 F Supp 2d 1022, 1027 (D Minn 1998) (stating that plaintiffs failure to com-
plain could limit her damages).
See Part I B 2.
2 See, for example, Kotcher v Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc, 957 F2d 59, 62
(2d Cir 1992) (harassing supervisor transferred and demoted). See also Sample Sexual
Harassment Policies, 520 PLI/Lit 431, 451 (1995) (listing referral to counseling, oral or
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complaining employee's job duties to insure that her career ad-
vancement stops. The advertising executive's supervisor can as-
sign her to small accounts with limited exposure that demand
little creativity. The partner can give the associate menial work,
ensuring that she will not have the necessary experience to stay
on the partnership track.
In the above examples, the employee does not suffer an im-
mediate economic harm. Her job title and compensation remain
the same. Yet after filing an internal complaint, her job responsi-
bilities differ significantly from those before she filed a complaint.
She is in a worse position than her co-workers because she com-
plained of sexual harassment. If an employee knew beforehand
that she would receive less desirable job assignments, she might
not report the harassment. If she does not complain, the em-
ployee would be worse off than her co-workers who were not vic-
tims of harassment. Permitting an employer to take limited re-
taliatory action without risking punishment jeopardizes Title
VII's goal of "make whole" relief.1" Title VII's enforcement proce-
dures cannot make an employee whole if the employer can put
the employee in a worse position with respect to her career ad-
vancement than if she had not reported the harassment. There-
fore, courts should interpret Title VII's retaliation provisions lib-
erally so that employees feel they can follow Ellerth and
Faragher's instruction to use internal complaint procedures with-
out making themselves targets for retaliation.
C. Title VII Reaches Conduct Other Than Ultimate
Employment Decisions
Contrary to the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits' assertion
that Title VII was intended only to reach ultimate employment
decisions,13 Title VII forbids many employment actions that fall
short of ultimate employment decisions. Otherwise, a cause of
action for a hostile work environment would not exist. An em-
ployee subjected to a hostile work environment does not suffer
from discharge, demotion, or decreases in compensation. Rather,
a hostile work environment is actionable because it interferes
written reprimands, transfer, suspension, termination, and referral to the criminal justice
system as possible disciplinary actions against violators of sexual harassment policy).
Albemarle v Moody, 422 US 405, 419 (1975).
Page v Bolger, 645 F2d 227, 233 (4th Cir 1981); Mattern v Eastman Kodak Co, 104
F3d 702, 707 (5th Cir 1997); Ledergerber v Stangler, 122 F3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir 1997).
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with the individual's working conditions.13' In addition to forbid-
ding conduct even when it does not cause economic harm, Title
VII permits a plaintiff not suffering psychological harm to re-
cover.
132
The Ellerth and Faragher decisions strengthen the view that
Title VII applies to conduct short of ultimate employment deci-
sions. Ellerth and Faragher hold that an employee may recover
from an employer for a hostile work environment created by a
supervisor even if the employee suffered no tangible employment
action.'33 The Supreme Court explained that tangible employment
actions include decisions such as hiring, firing, and failure to
promote, 13  actions that the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits
also include in their list of ultimate employment decisions. 135 If
the employer does not take such an action, however, an employee
can still hold the employer liable for sexual harassment provided
that the employer cannot prove the affirmative defense.1 36 Just as
an employee need not suffer an ultimate employment decision to
prove discrimination by her employer, an employee should not
have to demonstrate an ultimate employment decision to prove
retaliation, a form of discrimination. As the Supreme Court first
noted in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson,'37 "the language of
Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination.
The phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment evinces
a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women in employment.""' If an em-
ployer cannot alter the terms and conditions of employment
based on sex, then it should not be permitted to do so in response
to an employee's complaint of sexual harassment. The Fourth,
Fifth and Eighth Circuits misread the statute when they con-
clude that Title VII was designed only to reach ultimate employ-
"' Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67 (1986) ("For sexual harass-
ment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of
[the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.') (citation omit-
ted) (alteration in original).
"' Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21-22 (1993).
EUerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2268 ("A tangible employment action constitutes a significat
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in bene-
fits."). See also Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2284.
Page, 645 F2d at 233; Mattern, 104 F3d at 707; Ledergerber, 122 F3d at 1144.
1 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
477 US 57 (1986).
1 Id at 64 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ment decisions. 139 Congress designed Title VII to address dis-
crimination, whether or not it results in ultimate employment
decisions. 4 ° A broad view of adverse employment actions is most
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII.
D. Broad Interpretations of Other Aspects of Retaliation Law
A more liberal definition of adverse employment action than
the ultimate employment decision test better fits with courts' in-
terpretations of other definitions within Title VII's retaliation
provision. The opposition clause in § 704 forbids an employer
from retaliating when an employee "has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. "141
The Ninth Circuit explained that a literal reading of the statute
would protect an employee only when the conduct she opposed
actually violated the statute.142 For example, if an employee filed
an internal complaint of sexual harassment and her employer
responded by firing her, the employer's action would be legal un-
der a literal reading of the statute so long as the alleged sexual
harassment did not meet the "severe and pervasive" standard.'43
A literal interpretation of the statute, however, would chill
legitimate opposition to discrimination.' Furthermore, a strict
reading of the opposition clause would result in more complaints
to the EEOC.'45 The participation clause protects employees when
they participate in an EEOC investigation or hearing, regardless
of whether the underlying charge has merit.14 Thus, a narrow
reading of the opposition clause would lead to more EEOC
charges since employees need not worry about the strength of
their case if they file an EEOC charge.'47 The belief that "resolu-
tion of such charges without governmental prodding should be
Page, 645 F2d at 233 (4th Cir 1981); Mattern, 104 F3d at 707; Ledergerber, 122 F3d
at 1144.
" Meritor, 477 US at 64 (indicating that Title VII is intended "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment between men and women in employment.") (citation
omitted).
14 42 USC § 2000e-3(a)(1).
..2 Sias v City Demonstration Agency, 588 F2d 692, 695 (9th Cir 1978).
" See Hearth v Metropolitan Transit Commission, 436 F Supp 685, 688 (D Minn
1977).
'" Sias, 588 F2d at 695 ("Such a narrow interpretation, however, would not only chill
the legitimate assertion of employee rights under Title VII but would tend to force em-
ployees to file formal charges rather than seek conciliation or informal adjustment of
grievances.").
145 Id.
14 Id at 695 ("It is well settled that the participation clause shields an employee from
retaliation regardless of the merit of his EEOC charge.").
147 Id.
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encouraged"148 warrants a broader reading of the opposition
clause. Consequently, the opposition clause protects an employee
so long as she has a reasonable belief that the activity she op-
poses violates Title VII. 9
Courts have given a broad reading to the participation clause
as well. In McDonnell v Cisneros,"'° one of the plaintiffs alleged
that his employer retaliated against him for failing to prevent a
co-worker from filing a complaint. 51 The court concluded that the
participation clause protected the plaintiffs action. 52 The Sev-
enth Circuit acknowledged that a literal reading of the participa-
tion clause would not protect the plaintiff in this case.'53 In addi-
tion, the literal reading would allow an employer to retaliate
against all employees if the employer thought that one employee
made a charge but did not know which employee. 54 The court ob-
served that "li]t does no great violence to the statutory language
to construe 'he has made a charge' to include 'he was suspected of
having made a charge' and 'he allowed a charge to be made.'"'55
Additionally, the Supreme Court recently resolved an ambi-
guity in the statutory language of § 704 by holding that the stat-
ute protects former employees as well as current employees. 56
Title VII defines an employee as "an individual employed by an
employer."'57 In Robinson v Shell Oil Co,5 ' the Court concluded
that the statute was ambiguous as to whether an employee in-
cluded in § 704 also meant a former employee.5 ' Therefore, the
Supreme Court examined the purposes of Title VII generally and
the retaliation specifically to aid its interpretation.' 60 It noted
that § 703 protects employees from discriminatory discharge.'' If
the statute protected only current employees from retaliation,
then an employer could retaliate against an employee he fired by
1,8 Hearth, 436 F Supp at 689.
" Id ("When an employee reasonably believes that discrimination exists, opposition
thereto is opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII even if the
employee turns out to be mistaken as to the facts.").
150 84 F3d 256 (7th Cir 1996).
" Id at 261-62.
15 Id at 262.
153 Id.
1" 84 F3d at 262.
" Id (citation omitted).
I Robinson v Shell Oil Co, 519 US 337, 346 (1997).
" 42 USC § 2000e-2(f).
519 US 337 (1997).
5 Id at 345.
16 Id.
'e Id, citing 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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giving negative references to future employers.162 Further, em-
ployers would have an incentive to fire employees they suspect
might bring Title VII claims if the employer believed that post-
employment retaliation would prevent the discharged employee
from filing an EEOC complaint."6 The Court concluded that ex-
tending to former employees the coverage of § 704 was most con-
sistent with "a primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions:
Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mecha-
nisms." ' 4
Courts have interpreted the retaliation clauses liberally in
order to effectuate Title VII's goal of eliminating
discrimination.' To further that goal, the retaliation provisions
must enable employees to complain broadly of discrimination
without fear of risking their jobs," even if a court later deter-
mines that the employee's complaint lacks legal merit.167 Addi-
tionally, courts have read the statute as protecting a wide range
of employee opposition and participation. Consistent with this
reading, the statute should prohibit a wide range of retaliatory
actions. Allowing an employer to retaliate in a number of subtle
ways undermines the judicial interpretations of the range of pro-
tected activity. An employee can protest discrimination through a
variety of means, but an employer's ability to change the em-
ployee's work assignments or reprimand the employee under-
mines the otherwise broad protection of the retaliation provisions
and chills the incentive of employees to come forward and report
sexual harassment.
E. A Test to Define Adverse Employment Actions
The language, purposes, and judicial interpretations of Title
VII all support the view that employment decisions short of dis-
charge, failure to promote, and lowering compensation should
See Robinson, 519 US at 346.
Id (noting the "perverse incentive ... to fire employees who might bring Title VII
claims").
'" Id.
See, for example, Sias, 588 F2d at 695.
' See Note, Terminate, Then Retaliate: Title VII Section 704(a) and Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 75 NC L Rev 376, 400 (1996) ("The primary legislative purpose behind sec-
tion 704(a) is to remove the deterrent effect that fear of employer reprisal has on employ-
ees who might question employment conditions.").
" EEOC v Crown Zellerbach Corp, 720 F2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir 1983) ("It is not nec-
essary, however, that the practice be demonstrably unlawful; opposition clause protection
will be accorded whenever the opposition is based on a 'reasonable belief' that the em-
ployer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.").
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constitute adverse employment actions if they are retaliatory.
Courts need a different test to determine whether an employer
has taken an adverse employment action because the ultimate
employment decision standard inadequately protects an employee
from retaliation who follows Ellerth and Faragher's directive and
files a sexual harassment complaint with her employer."6 8 If an
adverse employment action includes only termination, demotion,
granting leave, or changing compensation, an employee who files
a complaint leaves herself vulnerable to retaliation in the form of
less desirable work assignments, poor evaluations, transfer, or
additional harassment. Such actions might not have an immedi-
ate effect on the employee's salary, but they could slow or impede
career advancement by making the employee's job intolerable.'
In addition to any economic or psychological injuries from the
initial harassment, the complainant faces a second punishment
in the form of retaliation. When a victim files an internal com-
plaint, the sexual harassment may stop, but the work environ-
ment may be no less oppressive and abusive.
The test most consistent with the language and purpose of
Title VII would require the plaintiff to show that "her future em-
ployment had been affected or that her ability to do her job had
been impaired,"70 termed the current ability/future opportunity
test. Instead of protecting employees from a few narrow catego-
ries of retaliation, the current ability/future opportunity standard
would protect employees from all employer decisions made in re-
taliation that adversely affect the plaintiffs current or future
employment. This standard proscribes a broader range of activity
than the narrow Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit standard that
forbids retaliatory action only in the form of ultimate employ-
" See text accompanying notes 123-26.
' See Collins v Illinois, 830 F2d 692, 703 (7th Cir 1987) ("One does not have to be an
employment expert to know that an employer can make an employee's job undesirable or
even unbearable without money or benefits ever entering into the picture.").
,70 McCoy v Macon Water Authority, 966 F Supp 1209, 1220 (M D Ga 1997). In McCoy,
the quoted language is used in connection with deciding whether an employer's action
altered the terms and conditions of employment so that it constitutes an adverse employ-
ment action. I reject the terms and conditions test used in McCoy because the statutory
language does not require that retaliatory action alter the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. See 42 USC § 2000e-3 (1994). However, courts can use the quoted language
more liberally to prohibit retaliatory action that would not be prohibited under a narrower
"terms and conditions" test. For instance, the district court in McCoy stated that retalia-
tory harassment must be sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and condi-
tions of employment. McCoy, 966 F Supp at 1220-21. Under my interpretation, harass-
ment would not have to be severe and pervasive to constitute a violation of 42 USC
§ 2000e-3.
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ment decisions.17' However, it does not go so far as to allow an
employee to have a valid retaliation claim for any negative deci-
sion in the workplace. A plaintiff must connect the employer's
action to a future job detriment or to a current inability to per-
form her job. The employee cannot sustain a retaliation claim
simply because she receives work that she does not like. Title VII
cannot eliminate all workplace tension,'72 but it does prohibit
manifestations of workplace hostility sufficient to interfere with
an employee's work.
Although the current ability/future employment test will re-
quire courts to question the motivation behind a broader range of
employer decisions, the inquiry itself is identical to that already
required under current law.173 If the employee establishes a prima
facie case of retaliation, then the employer has the burden of pro-
ducing a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its employment
decision. 74 If the employer offers a legitimate reason, then the
court must consider whether that reason is pretext for discrimi-
nation.' Protecting a broad range of adverse actions does not
change this inquiry. The only difference is that an employer will
have to justify its decisions to transfer or give poor evaluations to
an employee just as an employer now has to justify its decision to
terminate, demote, or change an employee's compensation. While
some cases may be difficult, this fact alone does not require de-
nying relief to an employee whose transfer or reprimand is obvi-
ously retaliatory.
The greater difficulty with a broad adverse action definition
is deciding which actions adversely affect the employee's present
or future employment opportunities. The task of deciding
whether an action is adverse is difficult, but not entirely specula-
tive. For example, applying the current ability/future employ-
ment opportunity standard to the case of work assignments, a
plaintiff could show that the quality of work assignments she re-
.. See text accompanying note 1.
' Oncale v Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc, 523 US 75, 80 (1998) (stating that Title
VII is not a "general civility code").
' One commentator argues that the ultimate employment test is more difficult for
courts to apply because courts are not equipped to tell whether a decision is "ultimate."
Instead, he argues that courts should evaluate whether retaliatory actions affect the
terms and conditions of employment because the language of Title VII already requires
courts to decide whether actions affect the terms and conditions of employment. Ernest
Lidge, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in Requiring Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer's Action was Materially Adverse, 47 U
Kan L Rev 333, 386-90 (1999).
" See note 34 and accompanying text.
... See note 35 and accompanying text.
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ceived differed before and after her complaint. Alternatively, she
could show that the quality of work assignments she received dif-
fered from that of work assigned to her co-workers who did not
raise sexual harassment complaints. To prove that the change in
responsibilities was adverse, the employee could demonstrate
that the change in assignments threatens her chance for pay in-
creases, promotions or some other future employment opportu-
nity. She could point to others in her position whom her employer
promoted and the qualifications and work experiences of those
employees.
To prove the adverse effect of an undeserved evaluation or
reprimand, the employee could show that the action lessens her
chances of advancement. She would have to point to other em-
ployees who received poor evaluations and who did not get pay
raises or promotions. If an employee can continue to advance in
the company even with a poor evaluation, then the evaluation
would not be an adverse employment action.
In determining whether an evaluation or reprimand is unde-
served, the court can look to the timing of the decision. A repri-
mand or evaluation that quickly follows a complaint suggests
that it might be retaliatory. 7 ' If an employee's annual evaluation
is not due for another four months and a supervisor completes a
negative evaluation a week after the employee files a sexual har-
assment complaint, the evaluation might not accurately reflect
the employee's performance because the employer departed from
its usual evaluation schedule. A court can also look to the em-
ployee's past evaluations as a benchmark. Of course, this does not
mean that an employee's evaluations must remain constant, but
a dramatic departure from past evaluations, otherwise unex-
plained, could raise an inference of retaliation. Additionally, the
employee can compare her performance to that of other employ-
ees. For example, the complainant can point to other employees
with a similar performance record who did not receive repri-
mands or negative evaluations because they did not complain of
harassment.
The current ability prong of the current ability/future oppor-
tunity test would prohibit retaliatory harassment. As the Su-
preme Court recognized in Meritor, harassment can interfere
with the terms and conditions of employment177 and thus fall un-
,' Wrenn v Gould, 808 F2d 493, 501 (6th Cir 1987) (causal connection between the
protected activity and adverse action "may be demonstrated by the proximity of the ad-
verse action to the protected activity").
"7 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986).
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der the current ability/future opportunity test because it inter-
feres with an employee's ability to perform her job. Although the
Tenth Circuit in Gunnell v Utah Valley State College7' held that
retaliatory harassment can constitute an adverse employment
action, the current ability/future opportunity standard covers
more harassing conduct than the court in Gunnell prohibited.
Gunnell prohibited retaliatory harassment only when it was so
severe or pervasive as to alter a term or condition of
employment. 17 The language of § 704 suggests that harassment
need not be so severe as to alter a term or condition of employ-
ment since the words "terms and conditions" are lacking from
§ 704.180 To qualify as an adverse employment action, retaliatory
harassment need only affect the employee's current ability to per-
form her job. Harassment that interferes with her work, even if
not severe and pervasive, should constitute an adverse employ-
ment action. If the retaliation clauses do not prohibit harass-
ment, then the employer could subject the complaining employee
to retaliatory harassment rather than sexual harassment. De-
spite complaining of sexual harassment, the employee remains in
an abusive work environment. If Title VII does not forbid retalia-
tory harassment, then it cannot meet its goal of eliminating em-
ployment discrimination and harassment.
While a broad definition of adverse employment action will
require courts to engage in a more fact-intensive inquiry in cases
that reach the courts, it may not dramatically increase the num-
ber of complaints filed with the EEOC and eventually adjudicated
in court because of Ellerth and Faragher's incentive for employers
to adopt effective sexual harassment complaint procedures in or-
der to avoid Title VII liability. 8' Ellerth and Faragher require
the employee to use complaint procedures in order to preserve a
legal claim. 2 Greater protections from retaliation will make em-
ployees more willing to use the employer's complaint procedure.
The employer has an incentive under Ellerth and Faragher to
investigate and try to correct harassment of supervisors in order
to preserve its affirmative defense."88 With these inducements,
parties are more likely to address their complaints internally and
not through the legal system.
178 152 F3d 1253 (10th Cir 1998).
"' Id at 1264-65.
See Part II A.
181 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
1' Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
"8 Ellerth, 118 S Ct at 2270; Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293.
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Moreover, even if the number of retaliation and sexual har-
assment complaints rises, this possibility alone does not justify
the ultimate employment decision test."" Such an increase will
likely mean that courts are hearing claims supported by the lan-
guage and purpose of Title VII rather than trivial claims outside
the scope of Title VII. The current ability/future opportunity test
does not mean that employees will file retaliation actions for any
employer action they find disagreeable. As one commentator
noted, "[I]f the at-issue changes in terms and conditions of em-
ployment are truly minor,... [m]any people will not be willing to
go through the hassles of filing an EEOC charge and dealing with
the investigators for something that is truly insignificant."8 '
III. THE ELLERTHFARAGHER AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND
RETALIATION
Both prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense po-
tentially present a court with questions involving retaliation.
First, courts will have to decide whether an employer that retali-
ates against an employee should be able to prove that it acted
reasonably to prevent and correct sexual harassment. Second,
courts will have to consider whether an employee behaves unrea-
sonably when she fails to report harassment because she fears
retaliation.
A. Employer Reasonableness
An employer who retaliates against an employee for report-
ing sexual harassment should lose the EllerthiFaragher affirma-
tive defense. The defense requires the employer to prove that it
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior."8 ' For most employers, a sexual
harassment policy and complaint procedure is necessary to sat-
isfy this prong.'87 However, to show that the employer behaved
reasonably, it is not enough for the employer merely to have a
sexual harassment complaint procedure on record. As one district
" Lidge, 47 U Kan L Rev at 409 (cited in note 173) ("Although the imposition of the
[ultimate employment decision requirement] may help clear court dockets or EEOC files,
such a desire should have 'no appropriate role in interpreting the contours' of a substan-
tive statutory civil right.").
" Id at 407-08.
1W Burlington Industries, Inc v Ellerth, 118 S Ct 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v City of
Boca Raton, 118 S Ct 2275, 2293 (1998).
"' See Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2293 (suggesting that a small employer would not neces-
sarily need a sexual harassment policy in order to show reasonableness).
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court noted, "Reasonableness requires more than issuing a pol-
icy."'88 The employer must show that it enforced the policy by
taking reasonable steps to prevent and correct sexual harass-
ment. 8 ' Retaliating against an employee who files a sexual har-
assment complaint is not a reasonable step in addressing a com-
plaint because Title VII makes retaliation unlawful.9 ° If retalia-
tion occurs, the employer has shown that it has not adopted a
reasonable or effective complaint mechanism. When an employer
retaliates, it takes away by its actions what it promised on paper
in its policy. An effective complaint procedure should "divest a
harassing supervisor of any power he has over the victimized em-
ployee." 9' A supervisor accused of harassment should not have
the ability to make decisions adverse to the complainant's em-
ployment interests as long as he is under investigation for har-
assment. For small employers, it may be difficult to arrange al-
ternative supervision for the complainant, but Title VII already
exempts the smallest employers from coverage.' 92 Employers can
use a number of means to prevent the supervisor from further
harassing or retaliating against the complainant. For instance,
employers have authorized temporary transfers away from the
harassing supervisor.' In some cases, employers can rearrange
working schedules so that the supervisor and harasser do not
work at the same time.'9'
The supervisor has the strongest motive to retaliate against
the complainant because of the potential punishment many sex-
ual harassment policies provide for harassers.'95 However, others
who know about the employee's complaint may be in a position to
retaliate against the employee as well. Many sexual harassment
policies identify several individuals with whom an employee can
Lancaster v Sheffler Enterprises, 19 F Supp 2d 1000, 1003 (W D Mo 1998).
" Id.
190 42 USC § 2000e-3.
... Sconce v Tandy Corp, 9 F Supp 2d 773, 778 (W D Ky 1998).
" 42 USC § 2000e(b) (1994) (-The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.").
'" Johnson v Brown, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 12689, *7 (N D Ill) (plaintiff temporarily
transferred from job as secretary for hospital's chief of police to the hospital's medical
administration service).
"' See, for example, Steiner v Showboat Operating Co, 25 F3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir
1994) (employer changed employee's shift to get her away from her supervisor; however,
the court questioned why the employer altered the employee's shift rather than the al-
leged harasser's shift).
" See note 128.
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file complaints.19 Thus, the individual to whom the employee
complains and those who investigate her complaint could retali-
ate against the employee. This situation calls into question the
adequacy of the employer's complaint procedure even more so
than if the supervisor were to retaliate. If the employees en-
trusted with administering a complaint procedure do not do so
fairly, then the employer has not demonstrated an effective policy
to prevent and correct sexual harassment.
Whether an employer loses the affirmative defense when co-
workers retaliate presents a more difficult question. Co-worker
reaction to a complaint might manifest itself in harassment of the
complainant. Even the most effective policy cannot alleviate all
workplace tension.197 The Tenth Circuit concluded that an em-
ployer could be liable for co-worker retaliatory harassment if the
employer organized or acquiesced in the harassment, or, in other
words, when it knew or should have known of the harassment.19
Accordingly, an employer should not lose the affirmative defense
as a result of co-worker harassment of which it was unaware.
However, an effective complaint procedure can minimize the op-
portunity for co-worker harassment by preventing co-workers
from finding out about a sexual harassment complaint. A com-
plaint procedure should maintain the complainant's confidential-
ity whenever possible.199 In some cases, co-workers may have to
participate in an investigation because they were witnesses to
allegedly harassing conduct. If co-workers must participate in an
investigation, the individuals investigating the complaint should
inform co-workers that the complaint is to remain confidential
" See, for example, Cadena u Pacesetter Corp, 18 F Supp 2d 1220, 1225 (D Kan 1998)
(employer's policy allowed employees to bring sexual harassment complaints to their im-
mediate supervisor, the supervisor's supervisor, the Vice President of Human Resources,
the Director of Human Resources, or to any member of management the same sex as the
complainant).
See note 172.
' Gunnell v Utah Valley State College, 152 F3d 1253, 1264-65 (10th Cir 1998).
19 See, for example, Sample Sexual Harassment Policies, 520 PLI/Lit at 450 (cited in
note 128):
To the extent possible, the sexual harassment investigative proceedings
will be conducted in a manner to protect the confidentiality of the com-
plainant, the alleged harasser and all witnesses. All parties involved in
the proceedings will be advised to maintain strict confidentiality, from
the initial meeting to the final agency decision, to safeguard the privacy
and reputation of all involved.
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and that the employer will not tolerate co-worker retaliation."o
An employer who facilitates co-worker retaliation by making an
employee's sexual harassment complaint widely known should
lose the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.
Denying the affirmative defense to an employer does not al-
low an employee to recover twice for retaliatory conduct. Rather,
when an employer loses the affirmative defense because it retali-
ates, the employee can recover for the harm created due to sexual
harassment and the additional harm of retaliation. When an em-
ployer responds unreasonably to the employee's complaint, it
should be liable for the damages the sexual harassment caused
the employee. Apart from the sexual harassment damages, the
employer who retaliates should also be liable for the harm the
retaliation caused the employee.
B. Employee Reasonableness
Turning to the second prong of the affirmative defense,
should an employee who fails to complain of sexual harassment
for fear of retaliation nonetheless be able to show that she be-
haved reasonably under Ellerth and Faragher? The El-
lerth IFaragher defense does not require an employee to complain
in every case in order to preserve a sexual harassment complaint.
For example, in Faragher itself, the plaintiff did not complain to
her employer.0 1 The failure to complain, however, was not unrea-
sonable because the employer did not provide the plaintiff with a
channel through which to complain since it did not distribute its
sexual harassment policy to the plaintiffs department. 2
Requiring that an employee use her employer's complaint
procedures in every case could leave employees susceptible to re-
taliation. Many employees attribute their failure to report har-
assment to their fear of retaliation.2 ' Allowing an employee to
recover for harassment even if she does not follow her employer's
grievance procedure risks undermining the defense. Any plaintiff
wishing to sue her employer could file a complaint, directly with
the EEOC and avoid her employer's complaint procedures if she
simply claims that she feared employer retaliation.
' Id; see also id at 451 ("It shall be a violation of this policy for any employee or non-
employee to take reprisals against any person because she or he has filed a complaint...
or assisted in any proceeding under this policy.").Faragher, 118 S Ct at 2281.
Id at 2293.
See Part I C. This Comment does not address whether an employee is reasonable
when she fails to report harassment for reasons other than a fear of retaliation.
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Nonetheless, an employee should have the opportunity to
prove that she acted reasonably in failing to report harassment
when her supervisor has made specific threats of retaliation if the
employee reported the harasser's conduct. When a supervisor
threatens to retaliate, the supervisor undermines the employer's
written policy through his actions. If a supervisor threatens the
employee with termination, for example, the employee should not
have to decide between reporting harassment or losing her job. In
contrast, an employee who fails to complain because she thinks
that her employer will retaliate but has no evidence of threats to
support her belief should be found to have behaved unreasonably.
Determining whether a supervisor has threatened an em-
ployee presents difficult issues of proof because the issue will
likely turn on the supervisor's word against the employee's word.
However, the question of whether a supervisor threatened an
employee is no more difficult for a factfinder to determine than
determining whether the supervisor harassed the employee. Once
the factfinder determines that the plaintiff has proven supervisor
threats, then it should consider whether the plaintiff's failure to
complain as a result of those threats was reasonable. Accordingly,
the district court in Fierro v Saks Fifth Avenue'" properly found
that the plaintiff could not prevail on the second prong of the af-
firmative defense because he could offer no specific threats of re-
taliation but only unsupported speculations that his employer
would retaliate.2 5
In evaluating employee reasonableness, the nature of the
threat itself represents the most important factor in deciding
whether an employee acts reasonably when she fails to report
harassment because of threats of retaliation. For instance, if an
employee quits her job because a supervisor threatens her with
violence if she reports harassment, the employee should not be
deemed unreasonable for not having followed her employer's
grievance process before bringing her complaint to the EEOC.
The interest in employee safety should outweigh the interest in
resolving complaints through internal employer mechanisms.
Lesser threats might not warrant a finding of employee rea-
sonableness for failing to report harassment. Although Title VII
should prohibit all retaliatory actions that inhibit the plaintiff's
current or future job abilities,0 6 this does not mean that all of
13 F Supp 2d 481 (S D NY 1998).
Id at 492.
See Part IIE.
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those actions are equally harmful. Consequently, a plaintiff is
more likely to demonstrate her reasonableness when she is
threatened with termination than when she is threatened with
less desirable job duties.
As the district court in Sconce noted, courts should consider
the employer's grievance procedure in determining employee rea-
sonableness.0 7 In Sconce, the harassing supervisor threatened
the plaintiff with termination if she reported harassment.0 8 Al-
though the plaintiff's failure to complain of harassment was not
automatically unreasonable, the court concluded that because the
employer's policy permitted Sconce to complain to someone other
than her immediate supervisor, her failure to report harassment
was unreasonable.0 9 Thus, an employee's fear of retaliation in the
form of termination might be reasonable, but a well-designed
grievance mechanism can alleviate the employer's fear by di-
vesting the threatening supervisor of any power over the com-
plainant. However, the court in Sconce also recognized that an
employer's grievance procedure in practice may operate differ-
ently than as written.210 Accordingly, even if the procedure pro-
vides the employee with a number of channels through which to
complain to ensure that her supervisor cannot retaliate, an em-
ployee should still prevail on the second prong of the affirmative
defense if she can show that the grievance procedures were not
fairly administered. To prove that the procedures did not operate
fairly, the plaintiff could present evidence of how the complaint
procedures failed to function properly in the past.
Considering the employee's sexual harassment policy in as-
sessing the employee's reasonableness ensures that employers
who create a well-crafted sexual harassment policy in compliance
with Ellerth and Faragher are rewarded for their efforts. If the
quality of the complaint procedure is not relevant, then an em-
ployer with an effective policy and an employer with a deficient
policy or no policy at all would be equally liable under Title VII
even though they are not equally culpable since the former em-
ployer has undertaken more effort to prevent and stop sexual
harassment.
In summary, speculative fears of retaliation cannot justify an
employee's failure to complain of sexual harassment. When an
employee can prove that her supervisor made specific threats of
9 F Supp 2d at 778.
Id.
Id.
0 See id.
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retaliation, however, the employee should not be found automati-
cally unreasonable when she fails to complain of harassment. The
employee's reasonableness will turn on the particular circum-
stances of her employment. The nature of the threat, the degree
of the harassment, and the effectiveness of the employer's har-
assment policy should all weigh in the determination of the em-
ployee's reasonableness.
CONCLUSION
Ellerth and Faragher emphasize Title VII's primary impor-
tance as a preventive measure. An effective sexual harassment
policy can prevent sexual harassment from occurring. In order for
employees to feel comfortable using that policy, however, they
must be assured that their employment status will not suffer as a
result of bringing a complaint. To ensure that an employee will
not suffer a loss of employment status in any way, § 704 of Title
VII must prohibit as adverse employment actions a wide range of
employer conduct. In deciding whether an employment action is
an adverse employment action, courts should ask whether it af-
fects the employee's current ability to perform her job or her fu-
ture employment opportunities.
When an employee files a sexual harassment complaint and
the employer retaliates, the employer should lose the El-
lerth/Faragher affirmative defense because it has promulgated
an inadequate sexual harassment policy. Assessing employee
reasonableness when she does not complain of harassment re-
quires a more fact specific inquiry. When the employee proves
that her supervisor threatened to retaliate, the employee should
be able to offer evidence to show that she acted reasonably.
